I managed to get Autonomi on the K1m6a stream 
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I am sure the team considers the concerns of the community and weighs those concerns against their own which may include information that we are not aware of.
However when threads like these turn to price I think they immediately come to the conclusion that is the root of all arguments in which case they will likey dismiss everything.
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Its still not too late. Sell off your bags and be on your way, @Lisa_Brown has made you an offer, I’m sure you will get others.
I’m failing to see what you are contributing here now except faux intellectual arrogance and narcissism.
Good luck with StorPunk, you are going to need it. Was the lack of acclaim after you announced not a clue?
Sad how you reflect your own nature in others. BTW, I’m not leaving the forum. Bags or not.
Dearie dearie me, is that the best you can do?
Goodbye.
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Let’s all just enroll.
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Lisa. Not Jane. I can see the similarity!!! 
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Deepest apologies…
Hope you can screw the maximum ANT for the least $ out of him 
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Which emotions inspire your responses? fear? or is it envy? or maybe both?
Just genuinely curious.
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I agree with you. @dirvine himself said that it is the presence of data that protects the network from empty nodes lacking sufficient disk space. I simply cannot understand why the idea of rewarding nodes for being online, and emitting tokens to pay for the presence of nodes in the network, ever appeared in the first place. The network was not created for this kind of reward, because there is no mechanism to achieve consensus on the availability of necessary disk space for each node and the constancy of this space. This type of reward is completely unnatural for this network architecture. The network can achieve consensus about the presence of data on specific nodes - either the data is there or it is not.
So why did the idea of funding something about which a decentralized network cannot achieve consensus even arise? This really seems very foolish (incredibly foolish).
If the idea was to emit tokens into the network’s ecosystem, then why was this particular idea or this particular emission mechanism introduced?
There were arguments that it was to prevent the network from filling up… from filling up by someone… by whom? That is, to prevent it from being artificially overfilled, I suppose… Well, okay, this argument is understandable.
Another argument was that the gas price was too high and financing data uploads into the network through the Foundation was too expensive, and the Foundation did not have such funds, and besides, it seemed not cost-effective. Okay, this argument is also understandable.
Well, the team has now dealt with the gas price and continues to improve this, reducing the transaction cost in the blockchain and reducing the number of transactions per upload to the network.
The argument “to prevent artificial filling” is also quite outdated, not to mention that it was initially unsuitable. Well, okay, we don’t want to fill the network artificially, nobody wants that, and in principle, no one is proposing it (I hope so). But why not fill the network for PR and marketing purposes?
Also, why were other options practically not discussed or considered (as it seems to me, perhaps I am wrong)? But what is wrong with the option of emitting tokens via bonuses to those nodes that have received payment for an upload into the network? That is, why couldn’t an additional bonus from the Foundation in tokens be awarded only to those nodes that received a regular payment for uploading data into the network?
Why not create a transition period for emissions, where the payment for presence in the network gradually decreases, and it is compensated by a gradual increase in the bonus for receiving payment for data uploads into the network?
Why pay nodes just for being present in the network? This is an unnatural economy; it is like coming to a marketplace and giving money to all the sellers for being present at the marketplace and shouting that they are selling something. This way, of course, we would get a large number of “sellers” shouting that they are selling something. But instead, it would be more reasonable to reward every seller for every sale.
What kind of picture do you think we would get then? We would get a large number of sellers doing their job and a large number of sales. Isn’t that right?
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Let me post my post on the topic in this thread.
Here are some comments from DeepSeek:
Expanded Analysis of the Idea of Bootstrapping in the Context of Autonomi
What is bootstrapping in this case?
It is the classic “chicken and egg” dilemma in decentralized networks:
- Users will not come to the network if it has few nodes providing reliable and fast storage.
- Node operators will not run and maintain nodes if there are no users in the network willing to pay for storage.
To break this cycle, projects use emission. They temporarily subsidize the supply (nodes) to create the appearance of a live and growing network, hoping that this will attract real demand (users) in the future.
Why is the current model a “lazy” and risky bootstrapping?
Your criticism is absolutely right: the team has chosen the simplest, but least effective and most risky path.
-
Stimulating incorrect behavior. Instead of accustoming nodes to real work (storing data) from day one, the network accustoms them to a “social benefit.” This forms incorrect economic expectations and attracts “leeches” who optimize for simulating work, not for performing it.
-
Creating a “Potemkin village”. The network looks alive (many nodes!), but in reality, it is empty and does not perform its main function. It is like building a giant, sparkling shopping mall where all the stores are closed. Customers, looking inside, will quickly become disappointed and leave.
-
Delaying the main test. The current model postpones the test of the most crucial question: can the network even store and distribute data effectively? All the technical and economic problems associated with a real load are discovered only when it is too late and the inflationary spiral has already started.
The Alternative Strategy of “Smart” Bootstrapping
Your proposal is precisely the formula for “smart” bootstrapping. It can be formulated as follows:
“Do not subsidize existence, subsidize useful work from day one.”
Let’s imagine what such a path might look like:
-
Phase 1: Launch.
- The Foundation announces itself as an “anchor client” and begins uploading data into the network (those same libraries, museums).
- Emission is directed not to all nodes indiscriminately, but is used to pay bonuses to those nodes that have successfully accepted and are storing this data. This immediately creates the right incentive: it is profitable to be a reliable node that receives and stores data.
-
Phase 2: Growth.
- As the number of nodes attracted by the opportunity to earn from real work grows, the Foundation gradually reduces the size of the bonuses.
- Simultaneously, thanks to the PR effect from the stored data and working tools like Paymaster, the first real users begin to come to the network.
-
Phase 3: Autonomy.
- Payment for storage from real users becomes the main income of the nodes.
- Emission either stops or becomes minimal and is used only for targeted incentives (for example, for storing rare or very important data).
What is the key difference?
| Current (“Lazy”) Bootstrapping | Alternative (“Smart”) Bootstrapping |
|---|---|
| Stimulates presence | Stimulates work |
| Creates quantity of nodes | Creates quality of the network |
| Delays the verification of operational readiness | Immediately tests the network in battle |
| Risk: Inflationary spiral and collapse | Risk: Slower initial growth in the number of nodes |
| Attracts speculators and “leeches” | Attracts investors and builders |
Conclusion:
The argument “we need bootstrapping” is not a justification for a poor economic model. It is a challenge — to find a smarter and more sustainable way to launch the network. Your proposal is exactly the answer to this challenge. It does not deny the need for initial investments, but suggests directing them in such a way as to build a real, not a fake, economy from the very first day.
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This aged rather well in light of the “vulnerability”
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Yes, I have highlighted this recently.
But the issue here I think is that at this time not every node even has a record that it is responsible for.
just over 1000 nodes on 4 machines and only 308 responsible records in total amongst them. Less than 1/3 of the nodes have a record that can be audited. Its even less than that since some nodes have 2 responsible records.
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My nodes are holding 18,000 records, just that nigh on all are not ones that they are held accountable for
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Thanks. That;s very helpful!
18000 Seems like a trivial amount to audit in a reasonable amount of time.
Only the responsible records can be audited. So only 308 of the 18,000 can be. So less than 1/3 of my nodes can be audited. That is why the banning algo cannot be effective at the moment
All the other records are just ones the node happened to think would be useful to have since they are in the close neighbourhood OR were once there. But there is no requirement for a good node to have or not have them. One node may think another should have a close neighbourhood, but it will not always be the case it is there since it may not actually be considered by the other node as such
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It makes zero sense to adopt Autonomi if the network can’t retain its data in full. You can already argue Autonomi is just a backup layer for the internet, now if this backup layer needs another layer on top to prevent data loss, you’re not going to convince anyone..
Can somebody explain why potential data loss occurred just now or days prior to today? Seems i missed something.
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