The multi input multi output features described above for combined transactions appear to describe how to handle farming rewards in a secure way.
Spitball 2: a) If initial dbcs are created and seeded throughout the network, then b) a farmer (or elder?) could combine 1 with proof of a valid storage/retreival to c) get the dbc reissued with a portion of it equal to the current farming reward and then transferred to the farmer.
The process is a “Safe Contract”, but it also bears resemblance to classic safecoin by analogy.
I don’t pretend to fully understand your suggestion, but the issue is about authority to distribute a pool (or mint new coins). Does your scheme avoid the risk that a corrupt section can send these funds where it likes?
I don’t see how you can have a pool of unissued tokens under control of the network without making the network an attractive target for attack. The point of the split or cap is to avoid having a pool under control of the network (or allow the network to mint tokens) because that makes it a valuable target.
Iiuc the procedure comes from an immutable safe contract placed on the network at genesis or the node code/software. The initiatior and recipient is the farmer. The elders validate whether the farmer has the authority to reissue the farming rewards dbc against the hardcoded farming algo or rules of a genesis contract. The rules could encode how to split the dbc based on farming reward. The authority comes from the farmer having proof of a successful storage/retreival, and the correct section prefix, or other authority/validation criteria.
With the use of dbc I’m not sure if “pool of unissued tokens” is a valid concept anymore. The entire 2^32 balance of snt is issued in the genesis dbc(s). The dbc validation process against the reward request/reissue should enforce basic conservation laws (input = output, no printing/generation of new snt).
Probably been brought up many times in the past, but doesn’t paying farmers extra just encourage the uploading of junk data? The amount of extra $$ would need to be low enough that there is certainty that a large attacker wouldn’t find reward in uploading junk. But if too low, then there isn’t much point in the reward. All of that seems like a hard problem – to know where that cut-off would be.
Edit: E.g. if I have the funds to run a huge farming operation, then I will definitely receive some amount of extra SNT reward for paying to upload junk.
I’d like to see the math on that.
Edit 2: especially as I’m being paid for permanent data, and I can just dump and restart from scratch every so often. It looks to me like this might be a profitable attack if I have enough farms. Just don’t know where the cut-off might be.
Edit 3: OTOH, the extra reward should push down price of the token on markets, which will make it easier for people to buy tokens to store data - but that also discourages them from farming themselves as a means of earning tokens on their own … so in a way I think this bonus reward is a centralizing feature - same is true for BTC I suspect.
Correct and if this was the only factor to consider then the 15% - 85% would win hands down in my opinion.
But we have to consider a lot of things and I have 60 odd comments to read and might change things I say now.
The issue of how to secure the network and how the flow of tokens work has some bearing too.
The effects on perception has effects too.
Its not an easy task to know how to distribute the 85% through a network that is meant to not know what other sections know and thus easy distribution of the 85% is not easy.
security of the tokens is easier if sections do not hold SNT of their own.
and many other factors (like people considering SNT more valuable if held by the 15%)
The point was that as time goes on the whale has much different effects between the 2 models. This is what I understood was being said. Would this actually happen is affected by more than ability to hold significant amounts. And I do doubt many would, I thought I explain what the idea is though.
A whale with 1% of total 4 billion (10% of all MAID)
15% - 85% model, the whale has 1/15 of all maid (or 1/10 of SNT available for markets since 5% reserved).
Over time that will reduce as farmers get tokens sourced from uploading and 85% Its the sourced from the 85% at the rate of approx 8% or more overall per year.
Thus their holdings will only represent 1/20 approx after the first 12 months.
100% to the 15% (67% to the MAID holders)
the whale has 1/10 of SNT available to markets.
After a year that is still 1/10 of SNT available to markets.
their influence does not change if they sit on it.
From this we see an incentive to sit on tokens for long periods for anybody with large holdings under the 100% distributed to the 15%
Now will the counter force of pricing work against that. Need market analysis to see.
@tobbetjI wonder with your experience if you could make a post here summarising the effects of both models (15%-85% & 100%) economically so that we can have a better picture of the issues.
Not thinking of much more than a short summary.
Would they do what they do now with MAID. Well like 2 years ago with the pumps and dumps when the whales owned a large part of the MAID. If they keep their large portion never reducing then I would think we will see pumps and dumps from time to time.
I mentioned this in the other topic and reducing the amount held from 85% in the 15%-85% model. I suggested that 50%-50% would be just as effective. Maybe even as low as 25% making a 75%-25% model giving the network a pool that is still quite large and then this represents say 5 years instead of the 20 years in the original papers. To my thinking it would allow the network to smooth out the algorithm and allow for events outside the control of the network to not cause issues for the network or in the minds of farmers due to large short term flux in store cost or rewards.
Yes. People still don’t see (or like to forget) the importance of an economic model that decouples put cost from storage/retreival reward, with the network buffer being used to absorb any imbalance. Elimination of this is analogous to removing the suspension from your car and driving down a bumpy road. The result will be greater volitility of PUT costs and GET rewards. High price volatility hurts useability imo.
Volatility is a function of the number of points of arbitrage IMO. The network buffer (whatever that might have been) is going to be algorithmic in nature I suppose, so would be factored into calculations by speculators looking to pump and dump the token … hence I don’t think it would make much if any difference.
Safe Network has a much better chance of taking center stage down the road and becoming the dominant crypto as it has use-cases well beyond smart contracts and money - so Metcalfe’s law I believe will favor Safe … as that takes hold more and more will build commercial sites on Safe and use the token as money for trade for their products and services, then we will have more and more points of arbitrage that will bring price stability.
I don’t think any algorithmic tricks are going to inhibit price manipulation and volatility in the short run though … this is a growing pain of any potential form of money.
Edit: the car analogy isn’t valid as humans are not adjusting the suspension in real-time as they do with markets.
Again, only about the fiat value of SAFE, there are other dimensions…
Well deserving if the MAID hodlers, receive the SAFE on the network and a good strategy to attract more hodlers. It helps to study crowdloans (which imho is a better model) and DAOs to better organise collective decisionmaking.
Yeah, I get that, was referring to the algorithm that would be utilizing that 85% (or a portion thereof).
It’s the same difference. Actors that want to manipulate the markets will create bigger potholes or throw logs onto the road. If the suspension then they will get in the car and jump up and down. Human actors break algorithms as they can model the algorithm and manipulate it. What is required are more humans working counter to the manipulators - that means we need more people using the token for a variety of things (points of arbitrage).
Sorry. The 5% also need to get the increased amount. Why should you reduce their benefit, that would be against the legal rules.
The 5% is supposed to be equal value to half the 10% of MAID. Suggest you read the original documents as they definitely suggest that to be the case. There would have to be a clause that says otherwise.
Or damping in a control system, just like the car suspension, or in the electronic control system (EG simple op-amp one), or in a programmed control system as in a PLC or otherwise.
There was the suggestion of a “pool” being (re)introduced which would become the new damping system.
The Store cost (put cost) to Rewards amount can be modelled as a control system and it would be interesting to know what is actually planed so a model can be made and see the effects of inputs to this control system would be. I did it for the old system and it worked really well, almost as if an engineer had suggested it (hint: it was), simple elegant and robust. Now will this new system be that, well may be the “pools” idea can make it suitable.
There is no need for it to be real smooth like the original, but I’d like to think it will be gentle and not so reactive as a simple input → output will be with no damping. If inputs remain smooth then all good, but inputs have a swing then potential for it to move into positive feedback and its gone. Lets wait and see their final plan.
I do understand and respect the need for having a change and DBCs offer an interesting way forward.
If you increase the SNT per MAID then you need to increase the SNT per share of the investors who put $$$ into the project. Andthing else is wrong
So if you give 2 SNT per 1 MAID then the SNT per share of the investors has to double too
If you give 6.7 per 1 MAID then you need to increase the SNT per share by 6.7 too and that means all SNT given out at this point.
