1, If the network has to rely upon this - epsecially in early days, then the networks long term viability is in question
2. It is questionable economically that this provides ANY useful value to nodes as they will likely hodl a bit for lean times and by dumping extra we are only suppressing the price - and suppressing dramatically in the early days if the curve stays as is. But I’ve already delved into that in previous posts above.
Also speculative. As price is being suppressed, it’s questionable if this is going to attract more nodes. And even if it does, long term as the bonus coin fades, those who got in for extra will just as easily leave … leading to network failure.
Speculation full stop. As I just demonstrated, you can speculate both directions and neither is provable.
Occam’s razor, Murphy’s law, and the KISS principle are being violated by the whole notion of the 70%. Why take chances with additional complication when we can’t know the outcome.
15% of an asset that is reduced in value 70% through an inflated marketcap. This is poor economics reasoning.
100% correct.
The risk to the network of the 70% being created at all are real and legit. Any advantages to creating them are nebulous and uncertain.
Therefore engineering principle KISS should prevail and the 70% should be abandoned as a flawed idea.
I was once in favor of the 70% long ago, then I climbed onto the fence, but now as the network comes toward fruition and I can see the risks more clearly, I am now firmly against it. It is a large risk that we shouldn’t take.
With that logic then everything about Autonomi is pure speculation, from people will find value in Autonomi to success or not. With that logic what can I say
I am piping up here based on previous Experience studying the Cosmos voting system on project proposals, which sort of works and, from which we can probably learn a thing or to as to what to do, or not do, if voting is adopted to guide development, adoption and growth of Autonomi…
So here goes…
imo the Autonomi Community discussion in this thread debating and considering a split model of automated emissions and democratically voting to determine where to place some of those emissions
to stimulate adotpion and growth of the network partly fueled by proposed and adopted improvements to the network in pure code development terms has been tried in many camps.
I have followed the COSMOS camp over the past 5 or so years and COSMOS have , imo,
struggled getting good proposals to actually be passed which would benefit their own growth and adoption
as the voting membership and directed outcomes are dominated by centrally pooled, heavily lobbied concentration of voting power held by POS Staking Pool Operators, which has a decisive weighted impact/big clout on the vote outcome for different proposals that more resembles a feudalist system, than a CH style pluralistic democratic voting system.
The COSMOS voting system is also ‘slowed or hurried’ by the rate at which these proposals are submitted and then voted on to get approval and the time frame in which the proposal is then codified and tested and applied by the current slate of ‘winning’ top 128+ Node Operators handling PoS Consensus.
The hurried part is distressing, because developer and QA make mistakes in releasing malformed code to node operators and when it doesn’t function properly, the whole Ecosystem reputation gets tarnished. This has happened to Cosmos more than a few times, and the result is key developer have left for other projects, slowing the progress of Cosmos Ecosystem.
Since the Cosmos vote control is really held only by BIG POS Node Pool operators, the small node operators have really only one choice delegate their votes to a BIG pool operator or have little or no impact on the vote outcome.
The whole Cosmos setup is very feudal and 100% Node Operator centric, and most times extremely slow in adopting impactful changes, where the growth of the Cosmos Hub Network of projects strapped to their Inter-blockchain Value are largely wired together by the IBC protocol as well and its ability to connect and run as either L2 or L1 Blockchain Meshes within the COSMOS ecosystem.
The take away for Autonomi imo, is the COSMOS voting mechanism sort of functions in a weirdly semi-pluralistic democratic + feudalistic fashion which leaves the devs/QA folks, Doc and Marketing and BD folks really doing a lot of the work that are not running PoS Pools ‘out in the cold’, really they are low paid serfs working for the greater good of the Node Operators.
That said, Cosmos and mob, when you add up the market cap of 50+ ecosystem players, Buchman (really Jay Li had more to do with Tendermint) and gang at Cosmos Ecosystem, do collectively ‘bat’ 5-6X well above the current market cap of just Cosmos Hub(ATOM) . Not bad, but they could have kept paced with Solana with a more refined voting system which was more inclusive.
As such, these days COSMOS have been going sideways collectively of late and, have really seen Solana and even Chainlink pull away, when they were all really ‘neck and neck’ just only a few years ago,
Which means the centralized benevolent dictatorships of Solana and Chainlink have outperformed COSMOS ‘democratic vote driven’ powered system of adoption, growth…
The reason imo for the Cosmos multiplier effect actually is their voting system, in that the external L1 and L2 players renting Cosmos and IBC enabled L1 Consensus capabilities are participating actively as an Inter-blockchain collective, which could be a lot better if they added the dimension I am describing below to be more inclusive to those that do all those that do the ‘other’ work in other areas of the Ecosystem. (which is just as valuable)
Non Node Operator Voting Mechanism for Autonomi?
Autonomi and the Community imo, could learn a thing or two from the Cosmos Ecosystem and do a whole lot better, doing so perhaps by
first including the ‘non-node operator’ Autonomi Ecosystem contributors in a voting scheme which sees the members of this previously ‘excluded from voting group’ (in the COSMOS Example) treated as a balancing (equal Weight 50/50) ‘electoral college like’, organized as members with declared “Areas of Interest and Participation” (Marketing, BD, Education, Docs, Research, New Feature Development, 3rd Party Testing etc…) which collectively as Areas of Ecosystem Interest are equal in overall voting weight (again 50/50) to the pluralistic democratic vote weight proposed and held by the node operators.
That means these “Areas of Interest” Voting Blocks grow in vote count assigned, 1:1 proportionately to the number of Nodes active in the network, where the node operators node count, determines the number of votes they have, per proposal which gets past the referendum phase add is tabled for voting by the Autonomi Foundation which is obligated to turn on the voting token faucet for that specific referendum ok’d proposal, which over a period of time sends out tokens to all active node operator wallets and non-node operator wallets, proportionate in the latter, to the number of registered wallets assign to specific Area of Interest at time of vote, where the non-node operator member can only exist, register wallet in one area of Interest in one proposal, during the voting epoch.
The previously excluded(Cosmos example) non-voting group
now included in the hypothetical Autonomi example described,
will then be seriously motivated as recognized/registered ‘voting’ forum members, to declare/register their voting wallet to an area of interest (each proposal, just one area), with their own Autonomi voting wallets (again receiving voting tokens from the faucet open/closed by the Foundation, only when a proposal reaches a proposal referendum level of interest, Where the Autonomi Foundation voting faucet issues voting tokens, per proposal, to ALL voting wallet holding members, where the referendum also asks the interested parties what is the pass % level of votes required )
IF such an above ‘combo’ voting mechanism was to be injected into the Autonomi Ecosystem to control the direction of emissions across all facets of the Autonomi Ecosystem, to help rapidly stimulate the growth and adoption of the network,
It’s going to need a lot more discussion here to properly create a set of voting requirements for the Autonomi Ecosystem, discussed on its own forum channel/thread., non?
And, perhaps with this combo voting system, the Emission split and royalty formulas can also be ‘fairly’ and ‘meritocratically’ massaged…
I guess this would be avoided with Autonomi due to the ease of running nodes + no benefit to pooling, so votes given to node operators in proportion to their earnings should be well distributed and avoid a few pools / big operators dominating.
But while it seems unlikely, I guess we can’t guarantee there won’t be huge operators (e.g. datacentre owners utilising spare resources), who could grab an unhealthy share of voting rights & therefore influence over emissions.
Perhaps both those paying to store data, and those storing data should get a share of voting rights from any transaction so that emissions usage could be directed by users of the network, and node operators?
True, but before getting into more detailed discussion, the team and community need to decide;
If the plan for emissions in the white paper is optimal? (If so, go ahead with it)
If not, are the emissions needed? (If not, scrap them)
If they are needed, how can they be issued to best serve the success of Autonomi? (Efficient discussion will be needed to put a workable plan to replace the whitepaper plan ASAP)
While I guess it might seem like a minor-point for the team who have loads on their plate chasing a tight schedule towards launch in October, the potential for mis-allocating 49%/70% of the supply of Network Tokens, that will probably be worth billions of dollars is, in my mind, worth considering very seriously.
Do you have any thoughts on the arguments I’ve made earlier in this thread that the emissions plan in the whitepaper is a wasteful & potentially harmful allocation of hundreds of millions / billions of dollars of value @rreive?
