$1 Million Dollar Bounty

[smacz]

The network most certainly must know your IP in order to know where to respond to with the GET fulfillments! However, there is only one point on the network that knows your IP address - the relay node.

@dirvine

You connect to different nodes each time with encrypted streams (to known nodes when you can) after you get on the network. So your ip address is scrubbed, you connect via a random port to a random node(s). I don’t see it as a design flaw but as the best that can be done.

@dirvine

client -> relay node(s) -> Client Managers (For Put)
client -> relay node(s) -> NameManagers (for Post/Get)

So the relay is almost dumb and does not need to be able to understand what is happening, just pass on “stuff” to an address. In terms of what is readable [to the hop after the relay node - aka your “close group” - ] then routing info minus IP and data (which on the network is encrypted) as well as signed requests to alter (Post) or plain Get requests.

So there’s the point of attack - the relay node. That is the part of the network that does have the information. As for the rest of the network, you are correct. It doesn’t have that information. But one element in it does.

So intercepting and decrypting the IP address, convincing the node to transfer the IP (spoofing/replay?), node impersonation, intentionally becoming the node, or otherwise obtaining the IP address of a target client would all be symptoms of a broken implementation of the network resulting in a “hack”. Again, this would be a broken implementation and hopefully a fix would be able to be engineered.

As far as verification goes, the attacker might have to go after a dummy client with a known IP address, and presenting documentation describing the hack and the result.

I am a strong proponent of utilizing a target/Capture The Flag mechanism for a pen test such as this.

EDIT: To further lengthen this already long post, @polpolrene wrote up a quick explanation of this:

@polpolrene

So, my random relay nodes have my IP:port:public key etc. So now they’re gonna watch the chunks come in and out and try to understand what I’m doing you think? Maybe they have lists of files and their chunks and try to catch me downloading an blockbuster movie from Hollywood? Well, time to add another layer of encryption.

Yes, you are in group of random relay nodes and some of them will know your IP because they need to get data from and to your computer. So in a group of 32 random relay nodes (based on XOR) maybe 4 or 5 will know you[r] IP. But now the magic starts, remember; you don’t ask for data on the network, your random relay nodes will. So while this group of random relay nodes is randomly chosen, you will connect to another group of nodes which are your (data)managers. The connection to that group will be the third layer of encryption, and maybe already a forth one! Because for something like “browsing” the Safenet you will use an identity to request data.

But let’s go back a little. So, your random relay nodes connect you to the manager-group who are “somewhere” in XOR-space. This connection will be encrypted so your random relay nodes cannot understand the data between you and the managers. Your managers on the other hand, will understand your requests but they have no clue about who you are. To them your just another XOR-adddress that’s close to them in XOR-space. This way the random relay nodes will work like a proxy to protect your identity.

(emphasis mine)